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CHOICE OF LAW IN SECURED PERSONAL 
PROPERTY TRANSACTIONS: THE 
IMPACT OF ARTICLE 9 OF THE 
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE · 
Russell], Weintraub* 
IT is likely that, in view of the adoption in forty-nine states of the Uniform Commercial Code (Code), particularly of article 9 deal-
ing with secured transactions,1 the incidence of interstate conflict-
of-laws problems concerning commercial transactions in personal 
property will be greatly reduced. The reason for this anticipated 
reduction is that the Code creates urtiformity in the applicable law 
governing the rights and duties bbth between the secured creditor 
and the debtor2 and between the secured creditor and third parties 
who challenge the secured creditor's right to enjoy his security in-
terest.3 
But even though the Code, by unifying substantive law, will 
probably decrease the frequency of conflicts problems in commercial 
transactions dealing with property, there are still likely to remain 
a substa:,;itial number of commercial property cases in which the 
need to choose the governing law will arise. The first reason for 
this situation is that the various state versions of the Code are not 
uniform. The state variations from the "official" text are most 
numerous in article 9. An extreme exatnple can be found in Cali-
fornia which departs from the official text in thirty-four of the fifty-
three sections of article 9.4 Second, as will become apparent in this 
• Marrs McLean Professor of Law, University of Texas School of Law. B.A. 1950, 
New York University; J.D. 1953, Harvard University.----"Ed, 
I. Louisiana is the only state that has not adopted the Code. The Code has also 
been adopted in the District of Columbia and in the Virgin Islands. 
2. See, e.g., UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CoDE [hereinafter UCC) §§ 9-503 (secured party's 
right to take possession after default); 9-504 (secured party's right to dispose of 
collateral after default, and effect of disposition); 9-505 (limitation on creditor's right 
to retain the collateral without reselling it and accounting for the proceeds). All 
references to the Uniform Commercial Code in this discussion are to the Uniform 
Laws Annotated, Master Edition (1968), unless otherwise indicated. 
3. See, e.g., UCC § 9-103 (choice of law to determine validity and perfection of 
security interests); UCC §§ 9-301 to -318 (rights of third parties). 
4. See ucc REP. SERV. Cal. correlation tables, at 16-31; CAL. COMM. CODE§§ 9101-507 
('\Test 1964, Supp. 1970). See also, e.g., UCC § 9-302; "(I) A financing statement must 
be filed to perfect all security interests except the following: ..• (d) a purchase money 
security interest in consumer goods; but filing is required for a fixture under Section 
9-313 or for a motor vehicle required to be licensed •..• " The words "or for a motor 
vehicle required to be licensed" are omitted in Hawaii [Act of June 29, 1965, § 9-302 
(l)(d), [1965] Hawaii Laws, 2d Vol. 136]; Massachusetts [MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. § 9-302 
(l)(d) (1963)]; Ohio (OHIO REV. CODE § 1309.2l(A)(4) (Page Supp. i969)]; Oregon [ORE. 
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discussion, the nieanings of Code provisions and an understandip.g 
Qt tne manner in which the various articles relate to one another 
do not leap ineluctably from the page. Much construction an4 
interpretation of the Code is needed. The.re fa great likelihood that., 
despite the salutary injunction of section 1-102 to construe the Cede 
with uniformity as a goal, and despite the existence of a permanent 
editorial board to oversee the operation of the Code, states will differ 
in their construction. of various Code prqyi&ions. A third reason why 
conflict-of-laws problems will probably continue in this area is that 
the Code leaves in force various nonuniform state enactments con-
cerning usury, small loans, and retail installment sales,5 thus ex-
cluding from the Code's unifying influence some aspects of vast 
numbers of commercial transacdons.6 Finally, transactions with 
foreign countries will continue to raise conflicts problems. 
It is therefore desirable, before discusi;;ing the cµoice-of -law provi-
sions in article 9, to discuss the pre-Code conflict-of-laws rules, both 
in terms of the non-Code transactions to which they will continue 
to apply and as background for understanding the conflicts rules in 
article 9. The Code's choice-of-law rules in turn will influence the 
future development of non-Code conflicts rules. A useful _division 
REV. STAT. § 79.3020{l)(d) (1967)]; Virginia [VA. CODE ANN. § 8.9-302(l)(d) (AA<litional 
Supp. 1965)]; Wisconsin [WlS. STAT. ANN. § 409.302(l)(d) (Supp. 1969)]. The' Wisc;onsin 
statute adds, after "goods,'' "having a purchase price' not in excess of $250." Section 
9-807(2) mitigates th~ e!fec;t Af § 9-3()g(l)(d) 4Y providing; 
ln the case qf consumer goo~ , •• {other ihan fixtures, see Section 9-313), a 
buyer takes free of a security interest even though perfected ~f he buys without 
Jcnowlec;Igc 9f the security inter-est, for value and for his own personal, f:~mily or 
household purposes ••• unless prior to the purchase the securecl party has filed a 
financing statement covering such goods. 
This pmvision i~ omitted in California. [C"-1,. CQMM. CopE § 9307 {West 1964)]; Kl!nsas 
[KAN. STAT. ANN. § 84-9-307 (1965)]; Maine [ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 9-307(2) 
(1964)]: Oklahoma [OKLA. STt-T. ANN. tjt. 12-A~ § !Hl07 (196m; Tennessee [TENN. GODE 
A~N. § 4,7-9-307 (Supp. 1969)]. ' , 
5. See UCC § 9-201, which provic;Ies: 
Not4iJlg in this ~ticle valiq~ti;~ a,11y oia,rge O!' practice illegal under any statute 
or regulation thereunder governing usury, small Joans, retail in~tallm!!nt sales, or 
the like, or extends the application of any such statute or l'egulation to any 
trl\nsai:tion not otherwise subjec;t theretQ. 
See also the official note to § 9-102, quoted in 1\0te )?8 infra. 
6. See UCC § 9-203(2), which provides: 
A transaction, although subject to this Article, is also subject to •.... , . , .•.. •, 
and in the case of conflict between the provisions of this Article and any such 
statute, the provisions of such statute control •••. 
Note: At • in subsection (2) insert reference to any local stat~t• regulating 
small loans, retail installment sales and the like. · · · · · 
• • • $pch acts may prqvide for licensing and rate regulation and may 
prescribe particular forms of contract. Such provisions should rempin in force 
despite the enactment of this Article. On the other ha71d if a Retail Install-
ment Selling Act contains provisions on filing, rights on aefault, etc., such 
provisions should be repealed as inconsist~nt with this Article. 
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of this discussion is to examine first the choice of law to determine 
the rights and duties as between a secured creditor and his debtor, 
and then, what law determines whether the rights of a secured 
creditor prevail over those of third parties who claim an interest in 
the goods. 
I. THE DEBTOR AND THE SECURED CREDITOR 
A. Pre-Code Conflicts Rules 
It is often said that the standard choice-of-law rule for deter-
mining rights and duties between a secured creditor and a debtor 
refers to the situs of the chattel at the time that the security interest 
attached.7 This situs rule does find some support in a few of the 
older cases,8 but it is doubtful that the rule ever represented the 
position of a majority of jurisdictions in the United States.0 The 
trend of modern choice-of-law analysis has been markedly away 
from any such rigid situs approach.10 That trend is illustrated by 
three cases which span thirty years of developments in choice-of-law 
doctrines for determining rights between debtors and secured 
creditors: Thomas G. Jewett, Jr., Incorporated v. Keystone Driller 
Company,11 Shanahan v. George B. Landers Construction Com-
pany,12 and Universal C.I.T. Credit Corporation v. Hulett.13 
In Jewett, the debtor was incorporated in, and had its head-
quarters in, Massachusetts. The creditor was a Pennsylvania corpora-
tion with headquarters in Pennsylvania. The debtor and the cred-
itor's local agent executed in Massachusetts a conditional sales 
contract for a power shovel. .AJ; agreed, the shovel was delivered to 
the debtor in New Hampshire where the debtor was working on a 
7. See REsTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 272 (1934) (conditional sale); R. 
LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICIS LAW 431 (1968); cf, R.EsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT 
OF LAws § 251 (P.O.D. III, 1969) ("the state which • • . has the most significant 
relationship"; "[i]n the absence of an effective choice of law by the parties, greater 
weight will usually be given to the location of the chattel at the time that the security 
interest attached than to any other contact • • • ."). 
8. See, e.g., United States v. Rogers &: Rogers, 36 F. Supp. 79 (D. Minn.), appeal 
dismissed, 121 F.2d 1019 (8th Cir. 1941) (whether mortgagor may sell property; situs 
also debtor's residence); Youssoupoff v. Widener, 246 N.Y. 174, 190-91, 158 N.E. 64, 
69 (1927) (whether contract of sale will be construed as a mortgage; "the construction 
and legal effect of a contract for the transfer of, or the creation of a lien upon, prop-
erty situated in the jurisdiction where the contract is made is governed by the law of 
that jurisdiction"). 
9. See note 21 infra. 
10. See R. LEFLAR, supra note 7, at 435 (situs dogma "rapidly disappearing'). 
11. 282 Mass. 469, 185 N.E. 369 (1933). 
12. 266 F.2d 400 (1st Cir. 1959). 
13. 151 S,2d 705 (La. Ct. App. 1963). 
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construction project. After the project was finished, the debtor stored 
the shovel in New Hampshire where it was repossessed by the cred-
itor nine months after it had been delivered to the debtor. The 
creditor shipped the shovel to Connecticut and there resold it with-
out notice to the debtor. The debtor then sued the creditor for 
conversion of the shovel, claiming that under New Hampshire law 
the debtor's right to redeem the collateral after default could not 
be cut off unless the debtor was given fourteen-days notice before 
resale. In this case, no such notice was given. The Massachusetts Su-
preme Judicial Court affirmed a judgment for the defendant, hold-
ing that Massachusetts law, not New Hampshire law, determined 
the debtor's right to redeem the collateral. Under Massachusetts law, 
the debtor lost its right to redeem when it failed to tender to the 
creditor, within fifteen days after repossession, the full amount due. 
The court characterized the problem as one of "contract" and held 
that the law of the place of making the contract applied, since it did 
not appear that the contract was entered into with reference to the 
law of any other state. Justice Lummus dissented, contending that 
the law of New Hampshire, the situs of the chattel from delivery 
until repossession, should have been applied. 
The Shanahan case arose when a Massachusetts company repos-
sessed in New Hampshire a power trench hoe that it had sold, by 
conditional sales contract, to a New Hampshire company. The con-
tract technically had been "made" in Massachusetts, because it was 
there that the seller signed and thereby accepted the contract that 
had previously been executed in New Hampshire by the buyer. 
As agreed, delivery of the hoe was made to the buyer in Vermont, al-
though the conditional sales contract had not included that condition 
in its terms. Thereafter, the buyer moved the hoe to New Hampshire, 
where it was repossessed because of the buyer's default in payment. 
Within ten days after he had repossessed the hoe, the seller removed it 
to Massachusetts and resold it. Although such resale was proper un-
der Massachusetts law, it violated a New Hampshire requirement 
that collateral remain in the state for ten days following repossession, 
during which period the vendee could redeem by tendering to the 
creditor the amount owed. The buyer brought suit for conversion 
in the federal district court in Massachusetts against the seller and 
others.14 
The district court applied New Hampshire law and gave judg-
14. The other defendants were the finance company to whom the contract and 
note had been assigned with recourse and a Mr. Shanahan who repossessed the hoe, 
bought it from Shanahan, Inc., and then resold it. 
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ment for the plaintiff.15 On appeal, the United States Court of 
Appeals for the First Circuit approved the application of New 
Hampshire law, but vacated the judgment and remanded for recom-
putation of damages under that law. Because the trial had been held 
in Massachusetts, the court of appeals was compelled, under the rules 
of Erie16 and Klaxon,11 to apply Massachusetts law. That court was 
thus called upon to construe Jewett and to apply it to these facts. 
The court first decided that Jewett required it to disregard whatever 
had been the fortuitous location of the collateral-somewhere in 
the midwest-at the time at which the conditional sales contract 
had been made. The basis for this conclusion was the fact that the 
Jewett majority had made no mention of what had been the loca-
tion of the shovel at the time of contracting. Further following 
Jewett, the Shanahan court decided to disregard the place of the 
chattel's delivery-Vermont, just as the Jewett court was not con-
trolled by the delivery of the shovel to a job site in New Hampshire. 
A more difficult problem for the court was whether to read Jewett 
as articulating a place-of-contracting rule and thus to apply the law 
of Massachusetts, where the conditional sales contract had been 
"made." In reaching its decision not to apply Massachusetts law, the 
court referred to a Massachusetts decision more recent than Jewett-
Budget Plan, Incorporated v. Sterling A. Orr, lncorporated,18 in 
which the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court had referred to 
Jewett as "contrary to the prevailing view."19 
For reasons indicated later, the Shanahan court's application of 
New Hampshire law should be applauded,20 but its use of the 
Budget Plan case as a device to avoid the place-of-contracting rule 
of Jewett is rather puzzling. When the Massachusetts court said in 
Budget Plan that Jewett seemed "contrary to the prevailing view," 
it was referring, as the "prevailing view,'' to the position that the 
applicable law was the law of the situs of the collateral at the time 
15. 266 F.2d at 402, 405. 
16. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
1'7. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 48'7 (1941). 
18. 334 Mass. 599, 13'7 N.E.2d 918 (1956). 
19. 334 Mass. at 601 n.1., 13'7 N.E.2d at 920 n.1. The Shanahan opinion stated: 
But it does seem to us that the remarks in the later case [Budget Plan] indicate 
that the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts now would not be disposed 
to extend the rule of the Jewett case to facts like those in the case at bar, where 
the purchaser of the chattel was not a Massachusetts corporation but a New 
Hampshire corporation with its headquarters in that state and where in addition 
the shovel was not only located in New Hampshire when it was repossessed, but 
also where the shovel would presumably be kept when not in use on out-of-state 
jobs. 
266 F .2d at 405. 
20. See text accompanying notes 23•26 infra. 
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of delivery to the buyer.21 In Shanahan, that view would have meant 
application of Vermont law-a possibility that the United States 
court of appeals rejected in reliance on Jewett. Thus, the Shanahan 
court used Budget Plan to avoid the place-of-contracting rule of 
Jewett, and it used Jewett to avoid the situs rule hinted at in Budget 
Plan. 
In Universal C.l, T. Credit Corporation v. Hulett,22 the defen-
dants, Louisiana spouses, had purchased an automobile in Indiana 
from an Indiana firm. The purchase was under a conditional sales 
contract executed in Indiana and immediately assigned to the In-
diana office of a finance company. The contract indicated that the 
buyers were Louisiana residents and that the automobile would be 
brought to Louisiana and kept there. Five months later the auto-
mobile was repossessed in Louisiana with the wife's ·written consent 
and was then returned to Indiana where it was sold at a public sale. 
The finance company brought suit in Louisiana against the buyers 
for a deficiency judgment. The company had done everything re-
quired under Indiana law to preserve its right to such a judgment: 
prior written notice of the repossession sale had been given to the 
debtors, and notice of the sale had been posted. Under Louisiana 
law, however, an appraisal of the automobile, fixing the minimum 
21. The court in Budget Plan reserved opinion on whether in a case in which the 
choice of rules would make a difference, as it did not in Budget Plan, it would apply 
the place-of-making rule of Jewett or the "prevailing view" rule. The Budget Plan 
opinion cited the following sources for the "prevailing view,'' all advocating the situs 
rule: "See Restatement: Conflict of Laws, § 272 [1934]; Goodrich, Conflict of Laws, 
§ 157 [3d ed. 1949]; and cases cited in the dissenting opinion of Lummis, J., in the 
Jewett case at page 479." 334 Mass. at 601 n.1, 137 N.E.2d at 920 n.l. 
The citation to Justice Lummus' dissenting opinion is to the following statement 
and string citation. It is ironic that not a single case in this string citation supports 
the situs rule in determining rights as between the secured creditor and the debtor. 
Every case cited deals with the rights of the secured creditor, not against the debtor, 
but against various third parties. A description of the third party in each case is in-
serted in brackets: 
Ordinarily the law of the place of delivery, at least where it does not appear that 
no further presence or use of the chattel there is contemplated, governs the rights 
of the parties under a conditional sale. Cleveland Machine Works v. Lang, 67 
N.H. 348 [31 A. 20 (1893)] [attaching creditor]. Knowles Loom Works v. Vacher, 
28 Vroom 490, 30 Vroom 586, [57 N.J.L. 490, 31 A. 306 (1895), afjd. mem., 59 N.JL. 
586, 39 A. 1114 (1896)) fsubsequent mortgagee]. Cooper v. Philadelphia Worsted Co., 
2 Robb. (N.J.) 622 [68 N.J. Eq. 622, 60 A. 352 (1905)] [judgment creditors]. Eli 
Bridge Co. v. Lachman, 124 Ore. 592 [265 P. 435 (1968)] fbona fide purchaser]. 
Mergenthaler Linotype Co. v. Hull, 239 Fed. 26 [(1st Cir. I!:ll6)] [trustee in bank-
ruptcyl. Smith's Transfer &: Storage Co. v. Reliable Stores Corp., 58 F.2d 511 ((D.C. 
Cir. 1932)] [warehouseman]. United States Fidelity &: Guaranty Co. v, Northwest 
Engineering Co., 146 Miss. 476 (112 S. 580 (1927)] [execution creditor). James 
Beggs &: Co. v. Bartels, 73 Conn. 132 (46 A, 874 (1900)) (buyers at execution sale]. 
H.G. Craig &: Co. v. Uncas Paperboard Co., 104 Conn. 559 [133 A. 673 (1926)] (re-
ceiver for benefit of creditors). 
282 Mass. at 479, 185 N.E. at 373 Oustice Lummus, dissenting). 
22. 151 S.2d 705 (La. Ct. App. 1963). 
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resale price, was necessary before the creditor could be entitled to 
a deficiency judgment; and no such appraisal had been made in this 
case. 
The Louisiana court of appeals held that Louisiana law was 
applicable, and it affirmed the trial court's granting of the defen-
dants' motion for summary judgment. The court reviewed various 
choice-of-law rules that had been applied in determining rights 
between a secured creditor and debtor-the law of the place of con-
tracting, the law of the place where the contract was intended to 
have effect, the law of the place where the collateral was intended 
to be kept, and the law of the place where the collateral was repos-
sessed-and found all_ these rules too rigid. The court noted that 
Louisiana had a significant interest in protecting the Louisiana resi-
dents from a deficiency judgment when an appraisal had not pre-
ceded resale; and it held that the contacts with Louisiana-which 
was the residence of the defendants and was the place where the 
automobile was intended to be kept and where it was repossessed-
were sufficient to make it reasonable for that state to give effect to 
its own policy. 
Thus, each of these three leading cases determined the manner 
in which the secured creditor should repossess and resell the goods 
if he is to preserve his right to a deficiency judgment and avoid 
liability to the debtor. Despite their disparate reasoning, all three 
courts applied the law of the place of the debtor's residence or prin-
cipal place of business when, as is usually the case, that place was 
where the creditor had reason to expect that the goods would be 
kept when not in use elsewhere. This same pattern-applying the 
law of the debtor's home state if the goods have a nexus with that 
state that the creditor should have foreseen-emerges from a great 
many of the modern cases dealing with rights between secured 
creditors and their debtors.23 That choice of law makes eminent 
23. See Susi v. Belle Acton Stables, Inc., 360 F.2d 704 (2d Cir. 1966) (method of 
foreclosure as between Maine creditor and Maine debtor held to be governed by 
Maine law, although the horses mortgaged were not in Maine either at time security 
interest attached or at the time foreclosure was made); United Sec. Corp. v. Tom• 
lin, 198 A.2d 179 (Del. Super. Ct. 1964) (whether creditor was entitled to deficiency 
judgment after private sale of automobile; court applied law of state of debtor's res-
idence, rather than law of state of seller's place of business); Phillips v. Englehart, 437 
S.W .2d 158 (Mo., K.C. Ct. App. 1968) (whether buyer of repair equipment was entitled 
to refund after default; court applied law of buyer's state, to which equipment was moved 
with consent of seller); Industrial Credit Co. v. J.A.D. Constr. Corp., 29 App. Div. 2d 952, 
289 N.Y.S.2d 243 (1968) (whether rights of buyer were violated by private sale after de-
fault; court applied law of buyer's state, where goods were to be shipped, although 
their situs at all relevant times was elsewhere); General Acceptance Corp. v. Lyons, 
125 Vt. 332, 215 A.2d 513 (1965) (court held that, in absence of choice-of-law clause 
in conditional sales contract, applicable law to determine whether vendor was en-
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functional sense.2' The debtor's state has a legitimate concern in 
extending to the debtor the protection of its repossession and resale 
requirements when that protection will not unfairly surprise the 
creditor and when the law sought by the creditor would provide sig-
nificantly less protection to the debtor.25 The debtor is likely to rely 
on the law of his home state with respect to redeeming the collateral; 
and if the creditor acts properly under the law of the debtor's state, 
it is not likely that any other state would have a significant reason 
for affording the debtor any greater protection.26 
B. The Code Conflicts Rules 
I. Should Section 1-105(1) or Sections 9-102 and 9-103 Be Applied? 
If one seeks to utilize the choice-of-law provisions of the Uniform 
Commercial Code in order to determine what law should govern 
the rights and duties between a debtor and a secured creditor, he 
confronts many puzzles for which the solutions are not clear. The 
first, and perhaps most fundamental, of these Code conundrums is 
whether to apply the basic Code choice-of-law section, 1-105,27 or the 
titled to deficiency judgment was law of "center of gravity" of contract-in this 
case, the law of the place where both vendor and vendee had business headquarters, 
not the law of the place where the property was repossessed and resold); Pioneer 
Credit Corp. v. Morency, 122 Vt. 463, 177 A.2d 368 (1962) (method of resale to pre-
serve creditor's right to deficiency judgment held to be determined by law of state to 
which conditional buyer, with permission of creditor, had moved property about a 
year after sale). 
24. See Cavers, The Conditional Seller's Remedies and the Choice-of-Law Process-
Some Notes on Shanahan, 35 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1126, 1140-42 (1960). 
25. For a thoughtful criticism of Hulett on the ground that Indiana law, al-
though different from Louisiana law, shared with Louisiana law the basic policy of 
protecting the vendee against inflated deficiency judgments, see Dainow, Variations on 
a Theme in Conflict of Laws, 24 LA. L. REv. 157, 163 (1964). 
26. One situation in which another state might have a significant reason for afford-
ing to the debtor greater protection than that available in his home state might occur 
when the creditor has acted in that other state in such a manner as to make it likely 
that a breach of the peace of that state would take place. Cf. Associates Discount 
Corp. v. Cary, 47 Misc. 2d 369, 372, 262 N.Y.S.2d 646, 650 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1965) (dictum). 
This situation may occur if self-help repossession is permitted in the debtor's home 
state, but forbidden in the state where the goods are located at the time of retaking. 
27. UCC § 1-105 provides: 
(1) Except as provided hereafter in this section, when a transaction bears a 
reasonable relation to this state and also to another state or nation the parties may 
agree that the law either of this state or of such other state or nation shall govern 
their rights and duties. Failing such agreement this Act applies to transactions 
bearing an appropriate relation to this state. 
(2) Where one of the following provisions of this Act specifies the applicable 
law, that provision governs and a contrary agreement is effective only to the 
extent permitted by the law (including the conflict of laws rules) so specified: 
Rights of creditors against sold goods. Section 2-402. 
Applicability of the Article on Bank Deposits and Collections. Section 4-102. 
Bulk transfers subject to the Article on Bulk Transfers. Section 6-102. 
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article 9 choice-of-law sections, 9-10228 and 9-103.29 
Section 1-105(1) provides the basic choice-of-law rules for the 
Code and thus for article 2, which covers sales. Section 1-105(2), how-
ever, indicates that the conflicts provision of 1-105(1) is superseded 
Applicability of the Article on Investment Securities. Section 8-106. 
Policy and scope of the Article on Secured Transactions. Sections 9-102 and 9-
103. 
28. UCC § 9-102 provides in pertinent part: 
(1) Except as otherwise provided in Section 9-103 on multiple state transactions 
and in Section 9-104 on excluded transactions, this Article applies so far as con-
cerns any personal property and fixtures within the jurisdiction of this state 
(a) to any transaction (regardless of its form) which is intended to create a 
security interest in personal property or fi.xtures including goods, documents, 
instruments, general intangibles, chattel paper, accounts or contract rights; 
and also 
(b) to any sale of accounts, contract rights or chattel paper. 
(2) This Article applies to security interests created by contract including 
pledge, assignment, chattel mortgage, chattel trust, trust deed, factor's lien, equip-
ment trust, condition~! sale, trust receipt, other lien or title retention contract and 
lease or consignment:"intended as security. This Article does not apply to statutory 
liens except as provided in Section 9-310. 
(3) The application of this Article to a security interest in a secured obligation 
is not affected by the fact that the obligation is itself secured by a transaction or 
interest to which this Article does not apply. 
Note: .... 
Where the state has a retail installment selling act or small loan act, that 
legislation should be carefully examined to determine what changes in those 
acts are needed to conform them to this Article. This Article primarily sets 
out rules defining rights of a secured party against persons dealing with the 
debtor; it does not prescribe regulations and controls which may be necessary 
to curb abuses arising in the small loan business or in the financing of con-
sumer purchases on credit. Accordingly there is no intention to repeal exist-
ing regulatory acts in those fields. See Section 9-203(2) and the Note thereto. 
29. UCC § 9-103 provides in pertinent part: 
(I) If the office where the assignor of accounts or contract rights keeps his 
records concerning them is in this state, the validity and perfection of a security 
interest therein and the possibility and effect of proper filing is governed by this 
Article; otherwise by the law (including the conflict of laws rules) of the jurisdic-
tion where such office is located. 
(2) If the chief place of business of a debtor is in this state, this Article 
governs the validity and perfection of a security interest and the possibility and 
effect of proper filing with regard to general intangibles or with regard to goods 
of a type which are normally used in more than one jurisdiction (such as auto-
motive equipment, rolling stock, airplanes, road building equipment, commercial 
harvesting equipment, construction machinery and the like) if such goods are 
classified as equipment or classified as inventory by reason of their being leased 
by the debtor to others. Otherwise, the law (including the conflict of laws rules) 
of the jurisdiction where such chief jlace of business is located shall govern. 
If the chief place of business is locate in a jurisdiction which does not provide 
for perfection of the security interest by filing or recording in that jurisdiction, 
then the security interest may be perfected by filing in this state. . • • 
(3) If personal property other than that governed by subsections (1) and (2) 
is already subject to a security interest when it is brought into this state, the 
validity of the security interest in this state is to be determined by the law (in• 
eluding the conflict of laws rules) of the jurisdiction where the property was when 
the security interest attached. However, if the parties to the transaction under-
stood at the time that the security interest attached that the property would be 
kept in this state and it was brought into this state within 30 days after the 
security interest attached for purposes other than transportation through this 
state, then the validity of the security interest in this state is to be determined 
by the law of this state. If the security interest was already _perfected under the 
law of the jurisdiction where the property was when the security interest attached 
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to the extent that the conflicts provisions of sections 9-102 and 9-103 
apply to secured transactions. The question thus arises: if a sale of 
goods also involves the creation of a security interest, which choice-
of-law provisions are to be utilized? At one pole is the suggestion; 
advanced by Professor Gilmore, that 1-105(1) is "irrelevant in any 
choice of law problem which involves an Article 9 security in-
terest."30 The other extreme, suggested in at least one opinion,31 is 
that 1-105 is to be used to select the law to apply between debtor and 
secured creditor even though the controversy centers on issues spe-
cifically covered by sections of article 9. It is submitted that both of 
these extreme approaches are wrong and that there is a middle way 
that is more responsive both to the scheme of the Code and to the 
need for sensible solutions to conflicts problems. 
Skinner v. Tober Foreign :Motors, Incorporated32 indicates the 
outlines of the problem. In that case, Connecticut residents had pur-
chased an airplane by installment contract from a Massachusetts cor-
poration. Negotiations for the purchase were conducted at seller's 
principal place of business in Massachusetts and all instruments in 
connection with the installment sale were executed there. The air-
plane was delivered to the buyers in Massachusetts, and they then 
removed it to Connecticut. The original contract called for pay-
ments of 200 dollars per month; but subsequent to that agreement, 
the parties orally agreed to reduce the payments for the first year 
to 100 dollars per month. Five months later, the seller demanded 
payment as originally agreed; and when the buyers failed to meet 
his demand, he repossessed the airplane in Connecticut, removed it 
to Massachusetts, and resold it. The buyers sued the seller in Mas-
and before being brought into this state, the security interest continues perfected 
in this state for four months and also thereafter if within the four month :period 
it is perfected in this state. The security interest may also be perfected in this 
state after the expiration of the four month period; in such case perfection dates 
from the time of perfection in this state. If the security interest was not perfected 
under the law of the jurisdiction where the property Was when the security in-
terest attached and before being brought into this state, it may be perfected in 
this state; in such case perfection dates from the time of perfection in this state. 
(4) Notwithstanding subsections (2) and (3), H personal property is covered by 
a certificate of title issued under a statute of this state or any other jurisdiction 
which requires indication on a certificate of title of any security interest in the 
property as a condition of perfection, then the perfection is governed by the law 
of the jurisdiction which issued the certificate. 
!10. 2 G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 44.11, at 1278 
(1965) [hereinafter GILMORE]. 
31. Atlas Credit Corp. v. Dolbow, 193 Pa. Super. 649, 165 A.2d 704 (1960), allocatur 
refused. Pennsylvania law was applied under UCC § 1-105(1) to determine whether 
notice to the buyer of the resale of repossessed goods was necessary. As Professor 
Gilmore has pointed out, there was no conflict of laws on this issue. 2 GILMORE § 
44.11, at 1279. 
32. 345 Mass. 429, 187 N.E.2d 669 (1963). 
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sachusetts for equitable replevin or damages, contending that, under 
the modified payment agreement, they were not in default and that 
the retaking and resale were wrongful. Under Massachusetts law-
section 2-209(1) of the Code-an "agreement modifying a contract 
needs no consideration to be binding."38 The seller, however, argued 
that Connecticut law was applicable and that under that law the 
modification was not binding because of lack of consideration. The 
seller relied for support on the choice-of-law provision of section 
9-103(2), which provides that the "validity and perfection" of a 
security interest in equipment of a kind "normally used in more 
than one jurisdiction" is governed by the law of the jurisdiction 
where the debtor's chief place of business is located-in this case 
Connecticut. The Massachusetts court rejected this contention, ap-
plied Massachusetts law, and affirmed a judgment awarding damages 
to the buyers. The court held that section 1-105 was the applicable 
choice-of-law provision in the Code and that under that provision 
Massachusetts law applied because the transaction bore "an appro-
priate relation to this state." It stated that the choice-of-law provision 
for the sales article applied, rather than that from the secured-
transactions article, because "[t]he issue in the case at bar involves 
the duties of the parties under the primary obligation; neither party 
contests the validity or perfection of the security interest."84. 
Professor Gilmore agrees with the court's reasoning to the extent 
of recognizing that the relevant Code sections do "suggest the pos-
sibility of splitting a purchase money transaction into two com-
ponents: a sale and a security transaction, with the result that the 
'sales' aspects would be governed by the broad rule of § 1-105 (an 
"appropriate relation") while the 'security' aspects would be gov-
erned by the narrmver rules of §§ 9-102 and 9-103."85 Nonetheless, 
he concludes that the Skinner court's choice of section 1-105 rather 
than sections 9-102 and 9-103 is "bad law."36 Despite Gilmore's 
position, however, it is submitted that the Skinner result not only is 
more in accord with the scheme of the Code than a selection of the 
article 9 sections would have been, but also that it is desirable in 
selecting the better of two unsatisfactory Code approaches to choice 
of law. 
The fundamental problem to be solved, before deciding what 
choice-of-law provision in the Code to apply, is to determine the 
33. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 2-209(1) (1963). 
34. 345 Mass. at 432-33, 187 N.E.2d at 671. 
35. 1 GILMORE § 10.8, at 319 n.5. 
36. 2 GILMORE § 44.11, at 1280 n.9. 
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extent to which the provisions of article 2, the sales article, continue 
to apply to a sales contract that is also a "secured transaction" gov-
erned by article 9. Some guidance is provided by the official com-
ment to section 2-102 which indicates that article 2 "leaves sub-
stantially unaffected the law relating to purchase money security 
such as conditional sale or chattel mortgage though it regulates the 
general sales aspects of such transactions." Thus the fact that article 
9 applies to some issues that might arise between a buyer and a 
secured seller-issues such as the seller's right to repossess or resell 
goods from a defaulting buyer,37 the buyer's right to redeem the 
goods,38 or the buyer's liability for a deficiency judgment39-does 
not preclude the application of article 2 to other issues that might 
arise between buyer and seller, so long as those issues are covered 
by a provision of article 2 and are not covered by a provision in 
article 9. That view of the scope of article 2 is consistent with the 
Code's central purpose of unifying the law governing commercial 
transactions. Indeed, it would be unwise to remove a transaction 
from the coverage of article 2 merely because there happened to be a 
security interest in the goods; if, in that situation, it should be dis-
covered that no provision in article 9 covered the issue, the resolu-
tion of the problem would depend upon reference to the nonuni-
form law outside the Code. 
Associates Discount Corporation v. Palmer4-0 illustrates the correct 
approach. In that case, the buyer had purchased an automobile 
under a contract that gave the seller a security interest in the vehicle. 
Following the buyer's default, the car was repossessed and resold. 
More than four years later, the seller's assignee brought suit against 
the buyer for a deficiency judgment. The court had to decide whether 
to apply the four-year limitation period of section 2-725 for bringing 
"[a]n action for breach of any contract for sale," or whether to hold 
that section inapplicable because the sale had been a secured 
transaction and to look instead to non-Code statutes of limitation 
because there was no applicable limitation in article 9. The court 
applied section 2-725 and reversed a judgment for the plaintiff, 
stating that a suit for a deficiency judgment 
37. With respect to repossession, see UCC § 9-503; with respect to resale, see UCC 
§§ 9-504 and 9-505. To complicate matters further, the secured party's rights after 
default are governed by article 2 if the debtor has not lawfully obtained possession 
of the goods and if the security interest arises under article 2. See UCC § 9-113. 
!18. ucc § 9-506. 
!19. See, e.g., UCC §§ 9-502(2), 9-504(2). 
40. 47 N.J. 183, 219 A.2d 858 (1966). 
696 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 68:683 
is nothing but a simple in personam action for that part of the sales 
price which remains unpaid after the seller has exhausted his rights 
under Article 9 by selling the collateral; it is an action to enforce 
the obligation of the buyer to pay the full sale price to the seller, 
an obligation which is an essential element of all sales and which 
exists whether or not the sale is accompanied by a security arrange-
ment. 41 
The reasoning in Palmer is right, and the dictum in In re Advance 
Printing v. Litho Company42-that "it is clear that Section 2-10248 
takes a security transaction without the scope of that article [ article 
2] in the code"44-is wrong. As the court in Palmer pointed out 
with respect to section 2-102, "[t]his section excludes from Article 
2 those dealings designed to operate only as security transactions 
"45 
1111 ••• 
Once it is recognized that article 2 may continue to apply to a 
transaction that is also covered by article 9, the decision whether to 
apply the choice-of-law rules of section 1-105(1) or those of sections 
9-102 and 9-103 is simplified. If the conflict-of-laws problem con-
cerns an issue covered by a provision in article 2, then the conflicts 
provisions of 1-105(1) are applicable. If the conflict-of-laws problem 
concerns an issue covered by a provision in article 9, the conflicts 
provisions of 9-102 and 9-103 are applicable. This conclusion is con-
sistent with the primary approach of the choice-of-law provisions in 
sections 9-102 and 9-103-to indicate when "this Article," meaning 
the forum's version of article 9, "applies" or "governs." It would 
seem logically difficult for "this Article" to "govern" if the issue 
affecting the debtor and the secured creditor is covered by no pro-
vision in article 9 but by a provision in article 2. 
The.conclusion that the conflicts provisions of section 1-105(1) 
41. 47 N.J. at 187, 219 A.2d at 861. 
42. 2.77 F. Supp. 101 (W.D. Pa.), a!Jd. mem., 387 F.2d 952 (3d Cir. 1967). 
43. UCC § 2-102 provides: 
Unless the context otherwise requires, this Article applies to transactions in 
goods; it does not apply to any transaction which although in the form of an un-
conditional' contract to sell or present sale is intended to operate only as a 
security transaction nor does this Article impair or repeal any statute regulating 
sales to consumers, farmers or other specified classes of buyers. 
44. 277 F. Supp. at 105. The court was referring to UCC § 2-302 which gives a 
court the power to modify or to refuse to enforce unconscionable contracts or clauses. 
For cases involving retail installment sales in which § 2-302 was applied, see, e.g., 
Frostifresh Corp. v. Reynoso, 54 Misc. 2d 119, 281 N.Y.S.2d 964 (Sup. Ct., App. Term 
1967); Jones v. Star Credit Corp., 59 Misc. 2d 189,298 N.Y.S.2d 264 (Sup. Ct., Spec. Term 
1969); cf. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir, 1965) 
(although an installment sale in which the seller retained title occurred before the 
Code was in effect, the court adopted a common-law rule patterned after UCC § 2-
302). 
45. 47 N.J. at 188, 219 A.2d at 861. 
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should be applied to a secured transaction when the issue concerning 
the debtor and the secured creditor is covered by a provision in 
article 2 not only is consistent with the structure of the Code, but 
also is desirable in light of the comparative quality of section 1-105(1) 
and sections 9-102 and 9-103. The choice-of-law provisions in section 
1-105(1) are unsatisfactory, because they permit the parties to in-
clude in their contract a choice-of-law provision that can, in effect, 
validate a contractual term that, on a proper evaluation of relevant 
state policies, should be invalid. Moreover, section 1-105(1) invites 
parochial application of forum law in situations in which the par-
ties have not agreed on what law should govern.46 Nevertheless, 
that section does require that choice of law be "reasonable" and 
"appropriate," thus leaving hope that, even under the Code, courts 
may continue to seek better conflicts results by analysis of policies 
underlying putatively conflicting domestic rules.47 In any event, 
whatever the shortcomings of the section 1-105(1) conflicts provi-
sions, they are minimal in comparison to those of sections 9-102 and 
9-103, in which, as will be seen, the Code reaches its nadir with re-
gard to both Delphic draftsmanship and regressive policy. 
2. Should Section 9-102 or Section 9-103 Be Applied? 
Once it is determined that an issue involved in a conflicts prob-
lem is covered by a provision in article 9 so that the choice of law is 
controlled by sections 9-102 and 9-103, it becomes necessary to decide 
which of those two sections applies to determine the rights and 
duties between a debtor and secured creditor. Section 9-103 contains 
choice-of-law provisions for the determination of the "validity" and 
"perfection" of security interests; but the extent to which those 
provisions apply in determining the rights and duties between 
debtors and secured creditors depends upon the scope of the mean-
ing given to "validity" and "perfection."48 
Under subsection (1) of 9-103, the "validity and perfection" of a 
46. For elaboration of these criticisms of UCC § 1-105(1), see Weintraub, Choice 
of Law in Contract, 54 IOWA L. R.Ev. 399, 406-12, 418-21 (1968). 
47. See Nordstrom &: Ramerman, The Uniform Commercial Code and the Choice 
of Law, 1969 DuKE L.J. 623, 641; cf. General Elec. Credit Corp. v. R.A. Heintz Constr. 
Co. 802 F. Supp. 958, 962 (D. Ore. 1969) ("appropriate relation" same as "signifi-
cant contacts'). 
48. See Rl!sTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLicr OF LA.ws ch. 9, tit. B, introductory note 
at 119·20 (P.O.D. III, 1969): 
[I]t has not been determined what issues are covered by the term "validity" as 
used in § 9-103. Undoubtedly, the term does include certain requirements as to 
formalities (see § 9-203), but it is not clear that the term covers such issues as 
capacity,. illegality and fraud. Also it is not clear that the term covers issues of 
reaempt1on. 
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security interest in assigned accounts or contract rights is determined 
by the whole law-thus including the conflicts rules--of the state 
in which is located the office where the assignor keeps his records 
concerning the accounts or contract rights. Under subsection (2), the 
"validity and perfection" of a security interest in "general in-
tangibles," mobile equipment, and mobile leased inventory is deter-
mined by the whole law of the state in which the "chief place of 
business" of the debtor is located. Subsection (3) applies to personal 
property not covered by subsections (1) and (2). If such property is 
already subject to a security interest when brought into the forum 
state, the "validity" of the security interest may continue for four 
months, but is to be determined by the whole law of the state in 
which the property was located when the security interest attached. 
If the security interest is not perfected in the forum and under 
forum law within that four-month period, the secured creditor's 
interest is to be regarded by the forum as perfected only from the 
date on which it is perfected in the forum. Subsection (4) does not 
mention "validity." Under that subsection, "perfection" is governed 
by the law of the state that issues a certificate of title to property if, 
as a condition of per£ ection, that certificate is required to indicate 
any security interest in the property. 
"Perfection" is the less troublesome of the two terms, and it is 
clear from the official comments that "perfection" does not relate 
to such matters as rights between a secured creditor and a debtor 
after default.49 Whether "validity" refers to such default rights, 
however, is less clear. The closest that the Code comes to defining 
"validity" is in official comment 7, paragraph three, following sec-
tion 9-103: 
Note that even after the four-month period, it is the law of the 
jurisdiction where the security interest attached which determines its 
validity. That is to say, such matters as formal requisites continue 
to be tested by the law with reference to which the parties originally 
contracted; other matters (rights of third parties, rights on default 
and so on) are governed by this Article. [Emphasis added.] 
Professor Gilmore interprets this statement as follows: 
The Comment is not a gem either of legal analysis or of English 
prose. Nevertheless, as through a glass darkly, it makes two quite 
relevant statements. (1) The term "validity" as used in subsection 
(3), and presumably in the other subsections, means "formal requi-
49. See UCC § 9-301, comment I, which reads: "As in section 60 of the Federal 
Bankruptcy Act, the term 'perfected' is used to describe a security interest in personal 
property which cannot be defeated in insolvency proceedings or in general by creditors." 
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sites." (2) The law which determines perfection and reperfection 
also governs default rights. That is, if litigation arises in State A 
(a Code state), the court should (according to the Comment) apply 
State A law to default rights if, under § 9-103(3), reperfection of an 
out-of-state security interest in State A is required. By implication, 
if State A is not the state of initial perfection or of reperfection the 
State A court should apply the law of the perfection jurisdiction to 
default cases between the parties as well as to cases involving the 
rights of third parties.5o 
That interpretation is wrong; the official comment and section 
9-103 do not mean any such thing. If the official comment conveys 
any meaning, it is that "validity" does not include default rights.51 
No word or phrase in section 9-103 can reasonably be read to include 
default rights. Instead, choice of law for default rights between a 
debtor and a creditor is controlled by the situs rule of section 9-102.52 
It is to that provision that the comment refers when it states that 
default rights are "governed by this Article." They are "governed by 
this Article," because section 9-103(3) refers to property that has 
been brought into the state that has enacted "this Article," and 
because section 9-102 says "this Article applies so far as concerns any 
personal property and fixtures within the jurisdiction of this state." 
The introductory phrase of section 9-102, "[e]xcept as otherwise 
provided in Section 9-103 on multiple state transactions," excludes 
from the coverage of 9-102 only the issues of "validity," "perfection," 
and "the possibility and effect of prope_r filing," none of which en-
compasses default rights. 
It would be better for choice-of-law purposes if Professor Gilmore 
were correct and default rights were tied to the section 9-103 per-
fection provisions. At least with regard to mobile equipment under 
section 9-103(2), the Code, by referring to the chief place of business 
of the debtor in order to determine default rights, would approximate 
the results that thoughtful pre-Code cases had been reaching under 
rudimentary forms of state-interest conflicts analysis.53 But, alas, that 
result is not what the Code has ·wrought. As between debtor and 
creditor, only matters of "validity"-that is, "such matters as formal 
requisites"-escape control by section 9-102. With regard to such 
50. 2 GILMORE § 44.II, at 1276-77. 
51. See also Cavers, supra note 24, at 1144; Holt, Some Conflict of Laws Problems 
Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 1962 U. ILL. L.F. 390, 394. 
52. See Associates Discount Corp. v. Cary, 47 Misc. 2d 369, 262 N.Y.S.2d 646 (N.Y. 
Civ. Ct. 1965) (whether resale without notice is proper). 
53. Professor Gilmore feels that the Jewett, Shanahan, and Hulett cases would be 
decided under the Code in the same way that they were in fact decided, so long as 
§ 9-103(2) controlled default rights. See 2 GILMORE § 44.10, at 1267, 1273. 
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formalities, one would have expected that a Code which is intended 
to serve the reasonable needs of the business community would have 
contained a flexible rule of validation, and would have thus upheld 
a transaction between a debtor and a creditor so long as it met the 
formal requirements of any state having a relationship with the 
parties or with the transaction sufficient to make the validation 
policy of that state relevant. 54 Differences in formal requirements 
among the states are almost certain to be matters of detail rather 
than of basic policy. Instead, however, section 9-103 foolishly ties 
validity on matters of formalities to the law of the state where 
records of assigned contract rights or accounts are kept, to the law of 
the state of the chief place of business of the debtor, or to the law of 
the state where the property was located when the security interest 
attached. Fortunately the references in section 9-103 are to the whole 
law of these states, including their conflicts rules; and these conflicts 
rules may provide the desirable alternative references for validation. 
But there is no similar liberating reference to whole law under sub-
section (1) if the records of assigned accounts or contracts rights are 
kept in "this state," or under subsection (2) if "this state"is the chief 
place of business of a debtor and the security interest is in mobile 
equipment. In such cases ''this Article" governs validity. Section 
9-103 does refer to "the law of this state" rather than to "this Ar-
ticle" for determining the validity of a security interest in goods that 
the parties understood would be kept in the forum state, but that 
reference applies only if the goods were brought into the forum state 
within thirty days after the security interest attached and were in-
tended to be used "for purposes other than transportation through" 
the forum. Still, the language of this section might be construed as a 
reference to "the [whole] law of this state," including conflicts rules 
that would provide alternative references for validation on matters 
so minor as formalities. 
It is fortunate that, when under sections 9-103(1) and 9-103(2) 
"this Article" must determine matters of formal validity, the provi-
sions covering formalities, such as section 9-11055 and section 9-203 
54. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF I.Aws § 244, comment i (P.O.D. III, 
1969). Concerning the analogous problem of formalities in the execution of a will, 
many states have statutes that make alternative references to various laws in order 
to uphold validity. See MODEL ExECUTION OF WILLS ACT, superseding UNIFORM WIUS 
ACT, FOREIGN EXECUTED § 7 (act withdrawn 1943); Rees, American Wills Statutes, 46 
VA. L. REv. 856, 905-06 (1960) (listing thirty-two states with statutes making some 
alternative reference for formal validity). 
55. UCC § 9-110 provides in pertinent part: "For the purposes of this Article any 
description of personal property or real estate is sufficient whether or not it is specific 
if it reasonably identifies what is described." 
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(l),@ are liberal ones that are unlikely to strike down a security 
interest. But Colorado,07 Florida,li8 Idaho,59 Kansas,60 and Missis-
sippi01 have stricter provisions in section 9-110. Moreover, with re-
spect to section 9-203, Colorado requires both spouses to sign an 
agreement creating a security interest-other than a purchase-money 
security interest-in consumer goods used by a family;62 and Wis-
consin requires the debtor's wife to sign if a non-purchase-money 
security agreement covers goods exempt from execution.63 These 
provisions in Colorado and Wisconsin can be applied rationally 
only when the state is the marital domicile. But marital domicile is 
not the nexus required under section 9-103. 
In summary, the choice-of-law provisions of section 9-103 do not 
56. UCC. § 9-203 provides in pertinent part: 
(1) Subject to the provisions of Section 4-208 on the security interest of a col-
lecting bank and Section 9-113 on a security interest arising under the Article 
on Sales, a security interest is not enforceable against the debtor or third parties 
unless 
(a) the collateral is in the possession of the secured party; or 
{b) the debtor has signed a security agreement which contains a description of 
the collateral and in addition, when the security interest covers crops or oil, 
gas or minerals to be extracted or timber to be cut, a description of the 
land concerned. In describing collateral, the word "proceeds" is sufficient 
without further description to cover proceeds of any character. 
57. COLO. R.Ev. STAT. ANN. § 155-9-110 (1963) provides in pertinent part: 
For the purposes of this article, any description of personal property is sufficient 
if it specifically identifies and itemizes in the security agreement what is de-
scribed as to consumer goods, and whether or not it is specific if it reasonably 
identifies what is described as to all other personal property. 
58. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 679.9-110 (1967) adds the following language at the end of 
the section: 
except that a description of real estate in an instrument filed to perfect a security 
interest in crops growing or to be grown or goods which are or are to become 
fixtures shall be sufficient only if the filing or recording of the same constitutes 
constructive notice under the laws of this state, other than this chapter, which are 
applicable to the filing or recording of real estate mortgages, and a mailing or 
street address alone shall not be sufficient. 
59. In IDAHO CODE ANN. § 28-9-110 (1967), the words "or real estate" are deleted 
from the section, and the following is added at the end of the uniform version: 
provided, however, that any description of real property be a legal description, 
that is, a description setting forth a United States government subdivision •.. 
or metes and bounds of the premises affected by the security interest and tied to 
primary control points which include either a section corner, quarter-section 
corner, or meander corner according to United States government survey. 
60. In K,\N, STAT. ANN, § 84-9-110 (Supp. 1967) the uniform version is preceded 
by the words, "[e]xcept in the case of a description of real estate concerned with 
goods which arc or are to become fbc:tures (section 84-9-402)." 
61. In MISS. CODE ANN, § 41A:9-110 (Supp. 1967), the following words are added 
at the end of the uniform version: 
except that description of real estate in an instrument filed to perfect a security 
interest in fixtures is sufficient only if the filing or recording of the same con-
stitutes constructive notice under the Jaws of this State, other than this Article, 
which are applicable to the filing or recording of real estate mortgages and deeds 
of trust. 
62, Coto. R.Ev. STAT. ANN, § 155-9-203(l}(b) (1963). 
63. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 409.203(2) (1967). 
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apply to default rights between a creditor and a debtor. Thus, to 
determine default rights between those parties, one is compelled to 
decipher and apply section 9-102. 
3. Section 9-102: Situs When? 
I£ taken literally, the language of section 9-102(1)-"this Article 
applies so far as concerns any personal property and fixtures within 
the jurisdiction of this state"-would produce irrational results. 
Under a strict interpretation of that section, the forum's version of 
article 9 would apply if the property was in the forum at the mo-
ment that the choice-of-law decision was made, even if the property 
had not previously been in the forum, and even if the events being 
scrutinized, such as repossession and resale, occurred elsewhere. That 
literal interpretation of section 9-102 might produce some interest-
ing examples of forum shopping and law shopping through chattel-
napping, but the results would be outrageous. Under such circum-
stances, the application of the forum's law could result in applying the 
law of a state that had no legitimate interest in having its law applied; 
and if such application unfairly surprised one of the parties, there 
would probably be a violation of the due process clause.64 Hence, 
the situs language of section 9-102 should not, and under some cir-
cumstances cannot, be taken literally. 
But if the presence of the property in a state at the moment of 
decision does not require the application of the state's law, at what 
time must the property be within the forum for the forum's version 
of article 9 to apply? One suggestion has been to apply the forum's 
law if the property was there at the time that the security interest 
attached.65 Under section 9-204, in the absence of an explicit agree-
ment to the contrary, a security interest attaches when there is an 
agreement that it do so, value is given, and the debtor has rights in 
the collateral.66 That approach, however., seems little better than the 
strictly literal reading, for the collateral's location at this particular 
moment might be completely fortuitous, especially in the case of a 
purchase-money security interest. Indeed, the situs of property when 
a security interest attaches bears no relationship to the interest of the 
situs state in controlling the conduct of the parties, particularly 
64. See Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930); cf. Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 
377 U.S. 179 (1964). 
65. See 1 GILMORE § 10.8, at 318 n.5. 
66. UCC § 9-204 provides in pertinent part: 
(1) A security interest cannot attach until there is agreement (subsection 3 of 
Section 1-201) that it attach and value is given and the debtor has rights in the 
collateral. It attaches as soon as all of the events in the preceding sentence have 
taken place unless explicit agreement postpones the time of attaching. 
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conduct that will occur after default, which may be months or years 
later at a time when the property is located elsewhere. 
Another approach is to allow the forum's article 9 to apply to 
an issue of repossession, resale, or redemption if the property was 
in the forum when the conduct in question occurred. For example, 
the forum's rules on retaking the collateral would apply if the 
property had been in the forum at the time that the secured creditor 
repossessed; forum law on manner of resale would apply if the col-
lateral had been in the forum when it was resold; and forum law of 
the debtor's right of redemption would control if the property had 
been in the forum when the debtor attempted to exercise his right 
of redemption. This construction of section 9-102, however, is also 
unsatisfactory, because it would enable the creditor to select the 
state whose law would govern his actions in reselling the goods. 
So long as the creditor followed the law of the state in which he 
disposed of repossessed property, he would be protected, regardless 
of whether he had acted wrongfully under the law of some other 
state that had an interest in protecting the debtor. Moreover, if the 
creditor moved the property across state lines after retaking it, the 
debtor's right of redemption might change depending on where the 
property was located at the moment that the redemption tender was 
made. 
If repossession, resale, and redemption must be governed by 
reference to some situs law, it seems preferable to apply the law of 
the place in which the collateral was located at the time of repos-
session. 67 That approach would deprive the creditor of the ability 
to select the applicable law simply by changing the situs, and it 
would have the merit of certainty in fixing the law by which the 
propriety of the creditor's conduct after default is to be judged. In 
addition, it is likely to make some rough functional sense in that 
the applicable law under this approach will probably be that of a 
state in which the debtor is doing business and has been using the 
property, thus giving that state a legitimate concern in determining 
the default rights of the parties. But even though this approach is 
the best of the "situs" solutions, it is still far from satisfactory. Its 
gain in certainty of applicable law may be far outweighed by the fact 
that some state other than the situs of the property at the time of 
repossession may have the predominant interest in controlling the 
protection to be afforded the debtor and the rights to be given the 
67. Cf. Associates Discount Corp. v. Cary, 47 Misc. 2d 369, 262 N.Y.S.2d 646 (N.Y. 
Civ. Ct. 1965) (held that whether notice of resale must be given is determined by the 
Jaw of the state where the property was repossessed and resold). 
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creditor. In General Acceptance Corporation v. Lyons,68 for ex-
ample, a Vermont debtor purchased a boat by conditional sales con-
tract from a Vermont creditor. While the debtor was sailing the 
boat from Maine to Florida, it proved unseaworthy off the Georgia 
coast and was taken to a Georgia port for repairs. The conditional 
vendor's assignee repossessed the boat and resold it in Georgia. The 
Vermont court was correct in holding that, insofar as it made any 
difference,69 Vermont law rather than Georgia law determined 
whether the creditor, in order to preserve his right to a deficiency 
judgment, had to give the debtor notice of the time and place for 
the resale. 
The foregoing discussion of section 9-102 has been in terms of 
when the forum is the situs referred to by that section so that the 
forum's version of article 9 applies. The reason for this approach is 
that section 9-102 speaks of when "this Article applies," meaning 
"this state's Article 9." It seems reasonable, however, to read section 
9-102 not as just a delimitation of the applicability of forum law, but 
as a choice-of-law rule. If-and it is a big "if"-the forum's law is 
properly applicable because the forum was the situs of the property 
at whatever moment is intended by section 9-102, then it appears 
that the law of the situs at that magical moment is properly appli-
cable whether or not that situs is the forum. Assuming that a non-
forum situs state has enacted article 9, that state would apply its own 
law if it were the forum and if it construed section 9-102 in the same 
manner as the forum has construed it. If the forum is not the situs 
referred to in section 9-102, and if the choice-of-law rule of that 
other situs differs from the forum's construction of section 9-102, 
some needed rationality and flexibility could be _introduced into 
the unduly rigid situs rule of section 9-102 by referring to the whole 
law of the situs state, including that state's choice-of-law rules.70 
That section 9-102 is intended as a general situs choice-of-law 
rule, not as just an indication of when forum law applies, is sug-
gested by the first sentence of official comment 3 to that section: "In 
general this Article adopts the position, implicit in prior law, that 
the law of the state where the collateral is located should be the gov-
erning law, without regard to possible contacts in other jurisdic-
tions." As indicated in the previous discussion of pre-Code conflicts 
rules,71 this situs rule, at least insofar as it concerns default rights, 
68. 125 Vt. 332, 215 A.2d 513 (1965). 
69. The creditor in this case did not prove Georgia law and the court assumed that 
it was the same as Vermont law. 
70. Cf. 1 GILMORE § 10.8, at 319 (whole law of situs when security interest attaches). 
71. See text accompanying notes 7-26 supra. 
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does not reflect "prior law" if one has any regard £or the results, the 
reasoning, or the trend of modem cases. Moreover, regardless of 
which of the several reasonable constructions is given to section 
9-102, the selection of which law under that provision governs de-
fault rights is made without proper regard either for the policies 
underlying putatively conflicting domestic rules or for the reason-
able concerns that situs and nonsitus states may have with protecting 
the debtor from oppression and the creditor from unfair surprise. 
II. THE SECURlID CREDITOR AND THIRD p ARTIES 
A. Pre-Code Conflicts Rules 
The classic triangle, involving a secured creditor, a debtor, and 
a third party, can be sketched as follows. The creditor acquires a 
security interest in goods situated in state X. He records his interest 
as required by the law of X so that, in X, his security interest would 
have preference over the claims of third parties who thereafter might 
deal with the goods in X. The debtor, however, transports the goods 
to state Y in which a third person, perhaps a bona fide purchaser or 
another creditor of the debtor, enters into a transaction involving 
the goods. On the basis of this transaction, the third person claims 
to have an interest in the goods that is superior to the security 
interest of the first creditor. The first creditor has not recorded his 
security interest in Y or has not done whatever else might be re~ 
quired by the law of Y for secured creditors to protect themselves 
against having their security interests superseded by the claims of 
persons dealing with the goods in Y. The question then arises: as 
between the secured creditor and the third person, who prevails? 
The almost universally recognized common-law rule was that 
the interest that a person acquires in personal property is determined 
by the law of the situs of the property at the time of the transaction 
on which that person bases his claim.'12 This rule, however, did not 
72. See Hervey v. Rhode Island Locomotive Works, 93 U.S. 664 (1877); Green v. 
Van Buskirk, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 307 (1866), 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 139 (1868) (held that New 
York is compelled to give full faith and credit to the law of the lllinois situs, which 
prefers the New York attaching creditor over a secured creditor who was not a party 
to the Illinois attachment suit); In re Herold Radio &: Electronics, 327 F.2d 564 (2d 
Cir. 1964); Fred E. Cooper, Inc. v. Farr, 165 S.2d 605 (La. Ct. App.), writ refused, re-
sult correct, 246 La. 838, 167 S.2d 667 (1964); Craig v. Columbus Compress 8: Ware• 
house Co., 210 S.2d 645 (Miss. 1968) (held that whether warehouse receipts are negoti-
able is determined by the law of the situs of the goods, not by the law of the 
place of negotiation; court also noted that this result was consistent with "center 
of gravity" rule); Marvin Safe Co. v. Norton, 48 N.J.L. 410, 7 A. 418 (1886) (situs 
rule carried to the extreme of giving the secured creditor more protection under the 
situs law against a bona fide purchaser than he had under the law of the creditor's 
state); Zendman v. Harry Winston, Inc., 805 N.Y. 180, 111 N.E.2d 871 (1953) (situs 
rule stated for determining whether factor could convey title to bona fide purchaser, 
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mean that in a situation like the preceding hypothetical case, the 
secured creditor would lose. Almost as universally recognized as the 
situs rule was the rule that the situs would recognize rights that a 
secured creditor had perfected in another state in which the property 
had been formerly situated,73 provided that the property had been 
but there was probably no conflict in laws); Torrance v. Third Natl. Bank, 70 Hun 
44, 23 N.Y.S. 1073 (Sup. Ct., Gen. Tenn, 1893) (held that under situs law conditional 
vendor loses to attaching creditor); W.H. Applewhite Co. v. Etheridge, 210 N.C. 433, 
187 S.E. 588 (1936) (situs law applied although it defeated a forum creditor's interest 
recorded at the forum); Cammell v. Sewell, 5 Hurl. &: N. 728 (Exch. Chamber 1860) 
(held that whether bona fide purchaser gets good title through sale by unauthorized 
ship's master is determined by situs law); REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF 
LAWS § 245 (P.O.D. III, 1969); Vernon, Recorded Chattel Security Interests in the 
Conflict of Laws, 47 IowA L. REv. 346, 355 (1962); cf. Ford Motor Co. v. National 
Bond &: Inv. Co., 294 Ill. App. 585, 14 N.E.2d 306 (1938) (secured creditor won under 
situs law, but he could have lost only through a combination of elements from both 
the law of the situs and the law of the place of contracting); Clark Equip. Co. v. 
Poultry Packers, Inc., 254 Miss. 589, 181 S.2d 908 (1966) (whether conditional sale 
must be recorded to protect vendor against attaching creditor was determined in 
vendor's favor by the law of the place of contracting, which was the same as the 
law of the place where the truck trailers in question were temporarily located when 
attached, but was contrary to the law of the debtor's principal place of business 
where trailers were based); Hornthall v. Burwell, 109 N.C. 10, 13 S.E. 721 (1891) 
(court permitted chattel mortgagee to recover against attaching creditor who had 
sold the goods, but it assumed that a court in the situs would reach the same de-
cision); Delaney Furniture Co. v. Magnavox Co., 435 S.W .2d 828 (Tenn. 1968) 
(whether receiver could recover preferential transfer was determined by law of situs). 
But cf. Charles T. Dougherty Co. v. Krimke, 105 N.J.L. 470, 144 A. 617 (1929) (court 
refused to give owner more protection under situs law against person to whom factor 
pledged the goods than owner would receive under law of owner's state); R. LEF-
LAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW 440 n.9 (1968) (result in Krimke partially explained 
by "misinterpretation of the facts of Marvin Safe'). Cases which did not apply the 
law of the situs include: Forgan v. Bainbridge, 34 Ariz. 408, 274 P. 155 (1928) (court 
refused to apply law of situs in which bona fide purchaser acquired automobile, when 
that law would have preferred purchaser over mortgagee); Edgerly v. Bush, 81 N.Y. 
199 (1880) (court refused to apply situs law under which purchaser would have pre-
vailed over mortgagee, since all parties were forum citizens). 
73. Forgan v. Bainbridge, 34 Ariz. 408, 274 P. 155 (1928); Merchants &: Farmers 
State Bank v. Rosdail, 257 Iowa 1238, 131 N.W.2d 786 (1964), modified, 257 Iowa 1238, 
136 N.W.2d 286 (1965); Brawner v. Elkhorn Prod. Credit Assn., 78 Nev. 483, 376 P.2d 
426 (1962); Churchill Motors, Inc. v. A.C. Lohman, Inc., 16 App. Div. 2d 560, 229 
N.Y.S.2d 570 (1962); J.A. Tobin Constr. Co. v. Grandview Bank, 424 P.2d 81 (Okla. 
1967); Bank of Atlanta v. Fretz, 148 Tex. 551, 226 S.W.2d 843 (1950) (Texas adopted 
"majority rule"); In re Union Acceptance Corp., [1955] 16 W.W.R. (n.s.) 283 (Alta. 
Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1955). See Raphael, Extraterritoriality of a Chattel Security Interest: 
A Plea for the Bona Fide Purchaser, 28 FORDHAM L. REv. 419, 420 (1959); Vernon, 
supra note 72, at 350; cf. Wells v. City Natl. Bank, 233 Ark. 868, 349 S.W.2d 688 (1961), 
(court refused to recognize mortgage recorded in another state, since mortgage was 
not refiled in forum within the period which the other state would require for refiling 
of out-of-state mortgages); Homthall v. Burwell, 109 N.C. 10, 13 S.E. 721 (1891) (court 
assumed that situs of attachment proceedings would recognize prior mortgage recorded 
at forum); Hannah v. Pearlman &: Selchen, [1954] I D.L.R. 282 (B.C. Sup. Ct. 1953) (bona 
fide purchaser at forum prevailed over conditional vendor who did not comply with 
conditional sales statute of jurisdiction where conditional sale was made). But cf. Fincher 
Motors, Inc. v. Northwestern Bank &: Trust Co., 166 S.2d 717 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1964) (held that, although interest of foreign mortgagee was protected, forum "pro-
cedure" denied him the remedy of replevin); Fred E. Cooper, Inc. v. Farr, 165 S.2d 
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removed to the new situs without the knowledge or consent of the 
creditor, and provided that the creditor, after learning of the new 
location of the property, acted with reasonable dispatch to perfect 
his interest under the law of the new situs, typically by recording 
it there.74 
These rules gave the secured creditor a substantial amount of 
protection. They shifted from the creditor the risk that the debtor 
would abscond with the goods to another state and there trick some-
one into parting with value for what that person believed was an 
interest in unencumbered goods. The argument most frequently ad-
vanced in favor of these creditor-protecting rules was that a state 
that did not recognize rights perfected elsewhere would quickly be-
come a dumping ground for stolen property. According to that 
argument, buyers of mobile goods, such as automobiles, would have 
no incentive to exercise care in determining whether there was an 
outstanding security interest in the goods.75 This reasoning does have 
605 (La. Ct. App.), writ refused, result correct, 246 La. 838, 167 S.2d 667 (1964) (con-
ditional seller lost to forum's materialmen); Universal Credit Co. v. Marks, 164 Md. 
130, 163 A. 810 (1933) (garageman's lien prevailed over conditional sales contract 
recorded out of state); Johnson v. Eastern Precision Resistor Corp., 19 Ohio Op. 2d 
150, 182 N.E.2d 59 (C.P.), afjd., 19 Ohio Op. 2d 150 (Ct. App. 1961) (assignee of ac-
counts receivable lost to creditor who garnisheed at forum). See Leary, Horse and 
Buggy Lien Law and Migratory Automobiles, 96 U. PA. L. REv. 455, 457 (1948) (despite 
lip service to supposed majority rule, courts found ways to protect the bona fide pur-
chaser). A case which did not follow the majority rule was Commercial Credit Corp. 
v. Pottmeyer, 176 Ohio St. 1, 197 N.E.2d 343 (1964); but it was partially overruled, in 
Hardware Mut. Cas. Co. v. Gall, 15 Ohio St. 2d 261, 240 N.E.2d 502 (1968). See also 
G.F.C. Corp. v. Antrim, 2 Pa. D. &: C.2d 377 (C.P. Luzerne County, 1954) (bona fide 
purchaser takes free of lien noted on title certificate that had been issued in another 
state). 
74. See UNIFORM CoNDmoNAL SALES ACT § 14 (act withdrawn 1943), superseded by 
UNIFORM CoMMERIAL CODE (must refile "within ten days after the seller has received 
notice of the filing district to which the goods have been removed"); Brown v. Cl.T. 
Credit Corp., 331 F.2d 246 (7th Cir. 1964) (law of situs to which creditor knew truck 
had been removed determined whether recording had been necessary); Davis v. P.R. 
Sales Co., 304 F.2d 831 (2d Cir. 1962) (court in situs to which equipment moved with 
consent of conditional vendor applied its own law to prefer trustee in bankruptcy 
over creditor, but it gave no indication that different result would be reached under 
law of vendor's state); Enterprise Optical Mfg. Co. v. Timmer, 71 F.2d 295 (6th Cir. 
1934) (law of situs to which creditor knew chattels had been removed determined 
whether recording had been necessary); J.A. Tobin Constr. Co. v. Grandview Bank, 
424 P .2d 81 (Okla. 1967) (decision in favor of secured creditor who did not record lien 
at situs was based on a finding that he did not know that machine was to be moved 
there); REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 253, comment b (P.O.D. III, 
1969); Davis, Conditional Sales and Chattel Mortgages in the Conflict of Laws, 13 
INTL. &: COMP. L.Q. 53 (1964) (reviewing English and United States cases); Raphael, 
supra note 73, at 420; Vernon, supra note 72, at 353-55. 
75. See Forgan v. Bainbridge, 34 Ariz. 408, 413-14, 274 P. 155, 157 (1928); Merchants 
&: Farmers State Bank v. Rosdail, 257 Iowa 1238, 1245-46, 131 N.W.2d 786, 790 (1964), 
modified, 257 Iowa 1238, 136 N.W .2d 286 (1965); Commercial Credit Corp. v. Pott-
meyer, 176 Ohio St. 1, 13, 197 N.E.2d 343, 351 (1964) (dissenting opinion); Bank of 
.Atlanta Y. :Fretz, 148 Tex. 551, 560, 226 S.W.2d 843, 849 (1950). 
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a certain amount of surface appeal. For example, the argument 
might have justified shifting from the secured creditor to the third 
person the burden of proof on the issue of the good faith of that 
third person. Also, when an automobile bearing an out-of-state 
license plate was offered for sale, application of this argument might 
have justified charging a person-particularly a used-car dealer-
with whatever that person could have learned by a diligent inquiry 
to recording officials of the relevant sister state.16 In addition, one 
might have preferred the first secured creditor over subsequent 
creditors, because the latter, like the first creditor, could have been 
expected to make a thorough credit investigation before parting with 
value for a security interest in the goods.77 Nevertheless, it was noth-
ing short of madness to shift the risk of the debtor's misconduct from 
the secured creditor to a consumer who in his home state purchased 
an automobile bearing license plates of that state, when no lien was 
recorded in that state and there was no way that the consumer could, 
by reasonable inquiry, learn of the existing lien. Yet that shifting 
of risk was frequently done.78 A comparision of the opportunities 
to investigate the debtor's background and to distribute losses caused 
by fraudulent debtors indicates that in the situation just described 
the bona fide consumer-purchaser should have prevailed.79 That he 
did not prevail was the gi:eat weakness of the pre-Code rules. The 
great strength of those rules was that the creditor had to act with 
reasonable dispatch to protect third persons in a new state once he 
knew that the goods had been removed to that state. Article 9 has 
wrought significant changes in this pattern. 
B. The Code Confiicts Rules 
One of the central choice-of-law issues between a secured creditor 
and a third person making competing claims to the same goods is 
what law should be applied to determine whether the creditor's in-
terest is "perfected" so that it "cannot be defeated in insolvency pro-
ceedings or in general by creditors."8° Furthermore, it is necessary 
to know what law determines both whether the creditor's interest 
has been properly filed and the "effect of proper filing" on other 
76. See Leary, supra note 73, at 472, 483. 
77. See Vernon, supra note 72, at 364-65. 
78. See, e.g., Merchants & Farmers State Bank v. Rosdail, 257 Iowa 1238, 131 N.W.2d 
786 (1964), modified, 257 Iowa 1238, 136 N.W.2d 286 (1965); Brawner v. Elkhorn Prod. 
Credit Assn., 78 Nev. 483, 376 P.2d 426 (1962). 
79. See Leary, supra note 73, at 483; Raphael, supra note 73, at 426-28; Vernon, 
supra note 72, at 363. 
80. UCC § 9-301, comment 1. 
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creditors and on bona fide purchasers. The Code choice-of-law rules 
on these matters are set forth in section 9-103.81 Which of these Code 
rules applies depends, in part, upon the type of collateral in which 
a security interest is claimed. 
1. Section 9-103(1) 
The perfection and filing of security interests in "accounts or 
contract rights" are covered by section 9-103(1). That section selects 
as the applicable law the law of the state in which is located "the 
office where the assignor . . . keeps his records concerning" those 
accounts or contract rights.82 "General intangibles," on the other 
hand, along with mobile equipment and mobile leased inventory, 
are covered by section 9-103(2) which selects the law of the state 
where the debtor's chief place of business is located. It is probably 
a mistake to draw this distinction. Both for "accounts or contract 
rights" and for "general intangibles," mobile equipment, and mobile 
leased inventory, the law chosen should be that of the state of the 
debtor's chief place of business, insofar as that place might differ 
from the place where his records are kept. In this computer age, the 
"records" might be kept in a central computer shared with other 
debtors and located in a state having no other connection with the 
debtor. Moreover, there is no good reason to require anyone to 
engage in the mind-boggling task of distinguishing between "ac-
counts or contract rights" under section 9-103(1) and "general 
intangibles" under section 9-103(2). The official comment to section 
9-106--the section that defines these terms83-is especially unsatis-
factory in this regard, for it uses the term "contractual rights" to 
define "general intangibles": "[t]he term 'general intangibles' brings 
under this Article miscellaneous types of contractual rights and 
81. For the full text of UCC § 9-103, see note 29 supra. See also UCC § 2-402(2), 
which protects creditors of the seller against sales of goods, when the seller's retention 
of possession is fraudulent under the law of the state where the goods are ~ituated. 
82. See Industrial Packaging Prods. Co. v. Fort Pitt Packaging Intl., Inc., 399 Pa. 
64!!, 161 A.2d 19 (1960) (applying law of state where assignor keeps its records and 
rejecting law indicated by parties in a choice-of-law clause). The law chosen in sub-
sections (1), (2), and (3) of § 9-103, if it is not the forum's version of article 9, is 
the whole law of the indicated jurisdiction, "including [its] conflict of laws tules." 
8!!. UCC § 9-106 provides: 
"Account" means any right to payment for goods sold or leased or for services 
rendered which is not evidenced by an instrument or chattel paper. "Contract 
right" means any right to payment under a contract not yet earned by perfor-
mance and not evidenced by an instrument or chattel paper. "General intangibles" 
means any personal property (including things in action) other than goods, ac-
counts, contract rights, chattel paper, documents and instruments, All rights 
earned or unearned under a charter or other contract involving the use or hire 
of a vessel and aII rights incident to the charter or contract are contract rights 
and neither accounts nor general intangibles. 
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other personal property which are used or may become customarily 
used as commercial security." In addition, as Professor Gilmore has 
pointed out, what starts life as a "general intangible" is likely to 
mature into an "account," and "contract rights" may change into 
either "accounts" or "general intangibles."84 
2. Section 9-103(2) 
Section 9-103(2), as indicated above, selects the law of the state 
of the debtor's chief place of business, not that of its state of incor-
poration,85 to cover the issue of the perfection of security interests 
in general intangibles and in certain mobile equipment and leased 
mobile inventory section 9-103(2) also covers the issue of the effect 
of.a proper filing of such security interests. To determine if the goods 
in a particular case constitute mobile equipment or inventory, the 
test is whether they are "goods of a type which are normally used in 
more than one jurisdiction"; it is irrelevant for purposes of this 
determination whether the goods are actually so used.86 Thus, sub-
section 2 applies to goods of this type even if they are in fact used 
in only one jurisdiction; and it does not apply to goods which are 
not of this type, even if those goods are transported across juris-
dictional boundaries.87 In addition to being mobile,88 the goods must 
be either "equipment," as opposed to consumer goods,89 or inven-
84. 1 GILMORE § 12.5, at 382. 
85. UCC § 9-103, comment 3 provides: 
"Chief place of business" does not mean the place of incorporation; it means the 
place from which in fact the debtor manages the main part of his business opera• 
tions. That is the place where persons dealing with the debtor would normally 
look for credit information, and is the appropriate place for filing. The term 
"chief place of business" is not defined in this section or elsewhere in this Act. 
Doubt may arise as to which is the "chief place of business" of a multistate enter-
prise with decentralized, autonomous regional offices. A secured party in such a 
case may easily protect himself at no great additional burden by filing in each 
of several places. 
86. See UCC § 9-103, comment 4. 
87. See In re Dennis Mitchell Indus., Inc., No. 17,240, CCH BANKR. L. REP. 11 63,328 
(3d Cir. J?ec. 18, 1969), reversing 280 F. Supp. 433 (E.D. Pa. 1968). For a discussion 
of the implications of this case, see Note, UCC-Secured Transactions-Judicial Sales-
Purchaser at Judicial Sale Takes Property Subject to Unperfected Security Interest 
of Which He Has Knowledge, 67 MICH. L. REv. 1421 (1969). 
88. UCC § 9-103(2) includes "airplanes" in its listing of examples of mobile goods. 
It should be noted that 49 U.S.C. § 1403 (1964) directs the administrator of the Federal 
Aviation Agency to establish a system for recording "[a]ny conveyance which affects 
the title to, or any interest in, any civil aircraft of the United States •••• " Any 
conveyance not recorded under this system is not effective against third persons who 
take without notice of the unrecorded interest. See International Atlas Serv., Inc. v. 
Twentieth Century Aircraft Co., 251 Cal. App. 2d 434, 59 Cal. Rptr. 495 (1967), cert. 
denied, 389 U.S. 1038 (1968), holding that the Federal Aviation Act provides a com-
plete and comprehensive recording system that supersedes inconsistent state laws. 
89. UCC § 9-109(2) classifies goods as "equipment" 
if they are used or bought for use primarily in business (including farming or a 
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tory00 that the debtor leases to others. For example, a company auto-
mobile used by salesmen in the company's business is mobile equip-
ment covered by section 9-103(2) even if in fact the automobile is 
used by the salesmen in only one jurisdiction. On the other hand, a 
family car used "primarily for personal, family or household pur-
poses" is "consumer goods," rather than equipment;91 and, assuming 
that it is not covered by a certificate of title under subsection (4), it 
is covered by subsection (3) but not by subsection (2), even if the 
family car is used in more than one jurisdiction. An automobile in 
the inventory of an automobile leasing company is the type of mobile 
inventory covered by section 9-103(2), but an automobile in the 
inventory of a new- or used-car dealer is not. It is possible, however, 
for an automobile to be used both as leased inventory and as inven-
tory for sale. That situation could occur if the debtor is a used-car 
dealer who also rents automobiles and who offers some of the same 
automobiles either for sale as used cars or for rental until sold. In 
such a case it seems reasonable to require the creditor to perfect both 
under the law of the state of the debtor's chief place of business, as 
required by subsection (2), and under the law of the state where the 
automobile has been located for more than four months, as required 
by subsection (3). 
Section 9-103(2) does not indicate what law applies if the debtor's 
main office is shifted to another jurisdiction after the security in-
terest attaches. The court in General Electric Credit Corporation v. 
TVestern Crane and Rigging Company92 applied the law of the state 
in which the debtor's chief place of business had been located when 
the security interest attached, rather than the law of the state to 
which his main office had been moved before the sale to a bona fide 
purchaser. That approach seems incorrect both in terms of official 
comment 5 to section 9-10393 and because it apparently fails to give 
profession) or by a debtor who is a nonprofit organization or a governmental 
subdivision or agency or if the goods are not included in the definitions of in• 
ventory, farm products or consumer goods. • . . 
See also I GILMORE § IO.IO, at 329; Ruud, Secured Transactions: Article IX, 16 ARK. 
L. REv. 108, 120 (1961). 
90. UCC § 9-109(4) classifies goods as "inventory" 
if they are held by a person who holds them for sale or lease or to be furnished 
under contracts of service or if he has so furnished them, or if they are raw 
materials, work in process or materials used or consumed in a business. Inventory 
of a person is not to be classified as his equipment. 
91. ucc § 9-109(1). 
92. 184 Neb. 212, 166 N.W .2d 409 (1969). 
93. UCC § 9-103, comment 5 states: 
If the debtor's chief place of business is moved into "this state" after a security 
interest has been periected in another jurisdiction, the secured party should file 
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reasonable protection to a subsequent purchaser or creditor who is 
likely to look for a recorded interest in mobile equipment at the new 
headquarters of the debtor. Under the circumstances present in 
Western Crane, however, the bona fide purchaser was not misled by 
the changed location of the debtor's main office, because in that case 
the buyer had purchased the crane in the state where the security 
interest had been filed and where the debtor's main office had 
formerly been located. Ironically, the subsequent buyer purchased 
from the conditional vendor to whom the debtor had returned the 
crane for repairs. That buyer lost to the assignee of the conditional 
vendor. 
So long as the collateral is the kind of mobile equipment or 
mobile leased inventory covered by section 9-103(2), the only perfec-
tion required is in the state of the debtor's chief place of business. 
There is no need to re-perfect in another state to which the equip-
:rnent is moved with the knowledge of the creditor, even if the 
equipment is used in that new state for longer than the four-month 
period specified in section 9-103(3). To perpetuate this situation 
seems unwise; refiling should be required to be made in the state 
where the mobile equipment is located if the equipment is used 
in that state for more than four months. Such refiling was required 
under earlier Code drafts94 and would not be an onerous require-
ment to impose on secured creditors. Moreover, this requirement 
would afford additional protection to subsequent purchasers and 
creditors who deal with collateral that may, depending on its use, be 
either mobile "equipment" or "consumer goods," who cannot tell 
which it is by looking at it, and who cannot know where to look 
for a recorded security interest. 
3. Section 9-103(3) 
Section 9-103(3) covers property not covered in subsections (1) 
and (2), and thus it applies most frequently to consumer goods or to 
equipment of a kind not "normally used in more than one juris-
diction." Suppose that property covered by subsection (3) is situated 
in state X when the security interest in issue attaches to the prop-
in this state, since Section 9-401(3) is inapplicable. 
UCC § 9-401(3) provides: 
A filing which is made in the proper place in this state continues effective even 
though the debtor's residence or place of business or the location of the collateral 
or its use, whichever controlled the original filing, is thereafter changed. 
UCC § 9-401, comment 6 states that subsection (3) of that section "is important only 
when local filing is required, and covers only changes between local filing units in 
the State." 
94. See UCC § 9-108 (1952 version). 
Mardi 1970) Choice of Law and Article 9 713 
erty, and that this security interest is perfected in X by filing there. 
The debtor then removes the property to Y where he sells it to a 
bona fide purchaser or where another creditor, without knowledge 
of the prior lien, parts with value for a security interest in the 
property. Under section 9-103(3), the creditor who perfected his 
security interest in X by filing there retains the protection of the 
law of X for four months after the property is taken to Y. Unlike 
the situation under prior law, the four-month time limit for perfect-
ing in Y begins to run when the property is taken to Y, even if the 
creditor does not know that it is there.115 Purchasers and creditors 
who attempt to acquire an interest in the goods in Y during this 
four-month period take subject to the prior perfected interest. That 
situation remains true even if the creditor fails to perfect his interest 
in Y within the four months.96 Thus, only those purchasers and 
creditors who take an interest in the property in Y after the four-
month period can prevail over a secured creditor who has perfected 
in X but who has not yet perfected in Y.97 
95. See In re Dennis Mitchell Indus. Inc., No. 17,240, CCH BANKR. L. REP. ,J 63,328 
(3d Cir. Dec. 18, 1969), reversing 280 F. Supp. 433 (E.D. Pa. 1968); In re Atchison, 6 
UCC R1;:p, SERV, 258 (E.D. Wis. Feb. 26, 1969, Bankruptcy No. 68-B-1761). See also 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFUCT OF LAWS § 253, comment b (P.O.D. III, 1969). 
96. This result is unlike the result under the ten-day filing period of UNIFORM 
CONDITIONAL SALES Acr § 5 (act withdrawn 1943), which states: 
Every provision in conditional sale reserving property in the seller, shall be 
void as to any purchaser from or creditor of the buyer, who, without notice of 
such provision, purchases the goods or acquires by attachment or levy a lien upon 
them, before the contract or a copy thereof shall be filed as hereinafter provided, 
unless such contract or copy is so filed within ten days after the making of the 
conditional sale. 
An interesting interplay between § 5 of the UNIFORM CONDITIONAL SALES Acr and ucc 
§ 9-103(3) occurs if state X has the Conditional Sales Act in force while Y has the 
Commercial Code. Suppose that the property is brought into Y within the ten days 
provided in the Conditional Sales Act, but the interest is not yet filed in X. Then, 
still within the ten days, the interest is filed in X. The question thus arises whether the 
security interest should be held to meet the requirement of UCC § 9-103(3) that it be 
"already perfected under the law of the jurisdiction where the property was when the 
security interest attached and before being brought into this state." Some cases have 
held that the interest does meet this requirement. See Al Marcone Ford, Inc. v. Man-
heim Auto Auction, Inc., 205 Pa. Super. 154, 208 A.2d 290 (1965), allocatur refused; 
Casterline v. General Motors Acceptance Corp. 195 Pa. Super. 344, 171 A.2d 813 (1961). 
But see General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Manheim Auto Auction, 25 Pa. D. 8: C.2d 
179 (C.P., Lancaster County, 1962). 
97. First Natl. Bank v. Stamper, 93 N.J. Super. 150, 225 A.2d 162 (L. Div, 1966); 
Churchill Motors, Inc. v, A.C. Lohman, Inc., 16 App. Div. 2d 560, 229 N.Y.S.2d 570 
(1962). See In re Dumont-Airplane 8: Marine Instruments, Inc., 203 F. Supp. 511 
(S.D.N.Y. 1962) (held that a trustee in bankruptcy prevails over a secured creditor 
in proceedings begun after the four months and before the security interest was 
properly filed); 1 GILMORE § 22.8, at 627. But cf. UCC § 9-103, comment 7: 
The four month period is long enough for a secured party to discover in most 
cases that the collateral has been removed and to file in this state; thereafter, if 
he has not done so, his interest, although originally perfected in the state where 
it attached, is subject to defeat here by those persons who take priority over an 
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Moreover, except in the situation in which the parties under-
stood at the time that the security interest attached that the property 
would be kept in Y and that property is then brought into Y within 
thirty days, the secured creditor gets the protection of the four-
month period even if he knows that the property has been removed 
to Y. 98 The creditor is not required to re-perfect in Y within a rea-
sonably short time after learning of the removal of the goods to Y.99 
That failure to impose a reasonable re-perfection requirement is an 
outrageous regression in the protection afforded to those who deal 
with a debtor in Y. The apparent countervailing benefit that sec-
tion 9-103(3) purports to confer on purchasers and creditors in Y 
is that the four-month period begins to run even if the creditor 
does not know that the goods are in Y. But that apparent benefit 
is actually illusory, except when it is used by a trustee in bankruptcy 
to defeat the creditor's claim; an absconding debtor is not likely to 
wait four months before selling the goods in Y. Thus, if protection 
unperfected security interest (see Section 9-301). Under Section 9-312(5) the holder 
of a perfected conflicting security interest is such a person even though during 
the four month period the conflicting interest was junior. 
In addition, cf. UCC § 9-312(5): 
[P]riority between conflicting security interests in the same collateral shall be 
determined as follows: 
(a) in the order of filing if both are perfected by filing, regardless of which 
security interest attached first under Section 9-204(1) and whether it at-
tached before or after filing; 
(b) in the order of perfection unless both are perfected by filing •••• 
It is submitted that comment 7 is in error and that the priority rules of § 9-312(5) 
are not intended to alter the absolute four-month protection that the secured creditor 
receives under § 9-103(2). 
The foregoing discussion of priority vis-a-vis a secured creditor, however, refers 
only to purchasers and creditors who take a subsequent interest in the property. Im-
provers and materialmen are likely to prevail over the secured creditor even if they 
acquire their liens during the four months. That was the rule under pre-Code law 
[see, e.g., Fred E. Cooper, Inc. v. Farr, 165 S.2d 605 (La. Ct. App.), writ refused, re-
sult correct, 246 La. 838, 167 S.2d 667 (1964); Universal Credit Co. v. Marks, 164 Md. 
130, 163 A. 810 (1933)]; and the same result is likely under the Code. See UCC § 9-310, 
which provides: 
'When a person in the ordinary course of his business furnishes services or 
materials with respect to goods subject to a security interest, a lien upon goods 
in the possession of such person given by statute or rule of law for such materials 
or services takes priority over a perfected security interest unless the lien is 
statutory and the statute expressly provides otherwise. 
For a case construing an improver's lien statute in favor of the secured creditor under 
UCC § 9-310, see National Trailer Convoy Co. v. Mount Vernon Natl. Barne &: Trust 
Co., 420 P .2d 889 (Okla. 1966). 
98. See Utah Farm Prod. Credit Assn. v. Dinner, 6 UCC REP. SERV. 937 (D. 
Colo. Aug. 1, 1969); 1 GILMORE § 22.8, at 626; Vernon, supra note 72, at 377. But cf. 
UCC § 1-203: "Every contract or duty within this Act imposes an obligation of good 
faith in its performance or enforcement." 
99. The Code's failure to impose such a requirement contrasts with the situation 
under UNIFORM CONDmONAL SALES Acr § 14 (act withdrawn 1943), which requires the 
creditor to refile "within ten days after the seller has received notice of the filing 
district to which the goods have been removed." 
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is to be adequate, the secured creditor should be required to re-
perfect in Y within a reasonably short time100 after he learns that the 
collateral has been removed to Y and that its presence in Y is in-
tended to be more than transitory. 
Not only has section 9-103(3) impaired some the strengths of the 
preceding law, but it also seems to have preserved the grave weakness 
of the prior law. The risk of the debtor's dishonesty is apparently 
shifted from the secured creditor to those who deal with the debtor 
in Y. That shift, however, may be merely apparent. Although section 
9-302(1) states that a security interest in consumer goods other than 
fixtures or motor vehicles required to be licensed may be perfected 
without filing,101 section 9-307(2) allows a bona fide consumer-pur-
chaser of those goods to take free of the perfected interest unless 
it has been filed.102 It could be argued, then, that.if the goods are of 
the kind in which a security interest can be perfected without filing, 
and if the security interest is filed in X but not in Y, the interest 
should, under section 9-103(3), be treated in Y as a perfected-but-
unfiled interest so that a consumer purchaser will take free of the 
security interest filed in X.103 Some support is given to that argument 
by the fact that 9-103(3), unlike subsections (I) and (2), speaks of 
"perfection" being governed by the law of X, but does not speak of 
the "effect of proper filing" being controlled by that law. Neverthe-
less, this argument that the shift in risk is only apparent seems con-
trary to the first sentence of section 9-103(3), which is seemingly 
intended to give the secured creditor the same protection in Y for 
four months as he would have in X.104 Consequently, section 9-103(3) 
should be amended so that those who, in good faith, deal with the 
goods in Y need not bear the risk of the debtor's dishonesty, unless 
100. Such a reasonably short time might be the ten-day period of the Uniform 
Conditional Sales Act. See note 99 supra. 
101. UCC § 9-302(l){d) provides: 
A financing statement must be filed to perfect all security interests except 
the following: 
a purchase money security interest in consumer goods; but filing is required for 
a fixture under Section 9-313 or for a motor vehicle required to be licensed; 
102. UCC § 9-307(2) provides: 
In the case of consumer goods and in the case of farm equipment having an 
original purchase price not in excess of $2500 (other than fixtures, see Section 
9-313), a buyer takes free to a security interest even though perfected if he buys 
without knowledge of the security interest, for value and for his own personal, 
family or household purposes or his own farming operations unless prior to the 
purchase the secured party has filed a financing statement covering such goods. 
103. See Vernon, supra note 72, at 378. 
104. Cf. General Elec. Credit Corp. v. Western Crane & Rigging Co., 184 Neb. 212, 
166 N.W.2d 409 (1969). 
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their dealings are of a kind that would make it reasonable to expect 
them to make the same character and credit investigation of the 
debtor as one would expect the secured creditor to have made. 
4. Section 9-103(4) 
Section 9-103(4) governs the issue of perfection of a security in-
terest, and supersedes subsections (2) and (3), if the personal property 
involved is covered by a certificate of title issued under a state law 
that requires as a condition of perfection that any security interest 
in the property be indicated on the certificate. Section 9-103(4) states 
that in such a case the perfection is to be governed by the law of the 
state that issued the certificate. Suppose that a title certificate is is-
sued on an automobile in state X, that the secured creditor's interest 
is indicated on the certificate, and that the debtor then moves with 
the automobile to Y which has no title certificate system. Under sub-
section (4) the creditor need not re-perfect his interest in Y even if 
he knows that the automobile is now garaged in Y.105 Moreover, 
because subsection (4) supersedes subsection (3), there is not even a 
four-month time limit within which the creditor must re-perfect in 
Y.106 For the reasonable protection of third parties in Y, however, 
the creditor should be required to re-perfect in Y within a reason-
ably short time after he learns that the automobile is in Y for more 
than transitory purposes; and the four-month time limit of subsection 
(3) should apply in cases in which the creditor does not know that 
the automobile is in Y.1°1 
Suppose that X is a state that does not have a title certificate 
system and that the creditor's interest in the automobile is perfected 
by filing in X. Suppose, further, that the debtor brings the auto-
mobile to Y, which has a title certificate system, and fraudulently 
acquires a Y title certificate that does not indicate the creditor's 
interest. Then, within the four-month period of section 9-103(3), and 
before the creditor re-perfects in Y, the debtor sells the automobile 
to a bona fide purchaser in Y. Is the creditor protected by the four-
month period of section 9-103(3), or is "perfection governed by the 
law of the jurisdiction which issued the certificate"-that is, Y? 
There is no clear answer in subsection (4), and courts have reached 
105. See General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Whisant, 387 F.2d 774 (5th Cir. 1968). 
106. In re White, 266 F. Supp. 863 (N.D.N.Y. 1967). 
107. See Vernon, supra note 72, at 380, 348: "[T]he system of [automobile title] 
certificates seems to have done little more than challenge the imagination of those 
intent on fraud." 
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conflicting conclusions on the matter.108 Nor does section 9-103(4) 
provide a solution £or the situation in which both X and Y issue title 
certificates, but the security interests of different creditors appear on 
those certificates.109 With respect to these points, then, section 
9-103(4) should be clarified. Whenever Y has issued a title certificate 
and the rights of third parties in Y are involved, it is the law of Y 
and the Y title certificate that should control, because the third 
parties are likely to have relied on that certificate.110 
III. CoNct.usroN 
Section 9-102(1), the general choice-of-law section £or article 9, 
should be repealed and not replaced. It is both too late in the day 
and too early in the continuing reform of conflicts law to attempt by 
any rigid, territorially oriented statutory fiat to provide a wise solu-
tion of all the choice-of-law problems that may arise under article 9. 
The courts should be free to continue their search £or intelligent 
accommodations of truly conflicting state policies. 
So far as the perfection of security interests and the possibility 
and effect of proper filing are concerned, it is desirable to have clear 
rules that tell the creditor where to file, show third parties where to 
look £or a recorded security interest, and indicate when and where 
the creditor must refile in order to be entitled to continued protec-
tion. Section 9-103 should be limited to these questions of perfection 
and filing, and it should be amended to provide clear answers and 
to give better protection to the interests of third parties who deal 
with the collateral. The following is a summary of the main sug-
gestions that have been offered along these lines. 
Section 9-103(1) should be changed to refer to the chief place of 
business of the debtor. 
In both 9-103(1), as so amended, and 9-103(2), it should be made 
clear that refiling is necessary when the main office of the debtor is 
moved to another jurisdiction after the security interest has attached. 
Mobile equipment and mobile leased inventory under section 
108. For cases holding that the creditor is protected by the four-month period of 
UCC § 9-103(3), see First Natl. Bank v. Stamper, 93 N.J. Super. 150, 225 A.2d 162 
(L. Div. 1966); Note, Security Interests in Motor Vehicles Under the UCC: A New 
Chassis for Certificate of Title Legislation, 70 YALE L.J. 995, 1021 (1961). For a case 
adopting the opposite position, see General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Manheim 
Auto Auction, 25 Pa. D. &: C.2d 179 (C.P. Lancaster County, 1962). 
109. See 1 GILMORE § 22.8, at 623. 
ll0. See In re Edwards, 6 UCC REP. SERv. 1124 (E.D. Mich. July 15, 1969, Bank-
ruptcy No. 69-460-B) (held that, when title certificate is issued in X and then a new 
certificate is issued in Y, creditor who does not comply with Y's filing requirement 
loses perfection). 
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9-103(2) should be subject to the four-month refiling limit of sec-
tion 9-103(3), if the equipment or inventory is continuously located 
for that period in a jurisdiction other than that of the debtor's chief 
place of business. 
Under sections 9-103(3) and 9-103(4), the creditor should be re-
quired to refile in the new situs jurisdiction within a reasonably short 
time after he learns that the property has been relocated there for 
more than transitory purposes. The four-month limit should be 
retained in subsection (3) and extended to subsection (4) for situa-
tions in which the creditor does not know that the collateral has been 
removed to a state that does not have a title certificate system. 
In section 9-103(4), it should be made clear that a title certificate 
issued at the new situs controls the continued viability of a security 
interest that was previously perfected, whether that previous perfec-
tion was in a state with a title certificate system or in a state without 
one. 
Under all the subsections of 9-103, the secured creditor, not third 
parties who bought in good faith, should bear the risk of the debtor's 
dishonesty, unless the third parties dealt with the debtor in such a 
manner that they should have reasonably made as extensive an in-
vestigation of the debtor's credit and character as one would have 
expected the secured creditor to have made. 
Whatever the theoretical desirability of all these changes, one 
important final question remains: is it politically realistic to expect 
state legislatures to effect such changes? I do not know. I do believe, 
however, that if the now unconscionable distance between what is 
the law and what ought to be the law is to be traveled, the legal 
profession had better have as its lodestar, not "political reality," but 
the best and fairest accommodation of conflicting interests. 
